JACK Warner has accused Dr Keith Rowley of assigning blame to Patrick Manning for everything that went wrong over the past few years and of not accepting that he and other members of the Cabinet were also culpable. Warner told his constituents they must "never allow Rowley to escape with that piece of foolishness, because [he] and Manning were all part of the same plan. Don't allow Rowley to abdicate his duty and hide behind the claim that those were Manning's wrongs. Those wrongs were Manning's wrongs and his [as well]....If Rowley was not kicked out of the Cabinet, to this day, you would not have heard a word. But he comes now, as if he is this country's saviour". (Express, July 12, 2010).

Mr Warner's accusation raises interesting questions about who must be held to account for what went wrong in Mr Manning's regime, particularly the decisions that had disastrous implications. Some put the blame on Mr Manning alone. Much was done, it is said, without the prior knowledge of the Cabinet, and even when matters did come to cabinet eventually, the decisions had already been made. Cabinet's role was to rubber stamp what had been decided in bilaterals with the Prime Minister.

According to this line of argument, Mr Manning's managerial style was presidential and as such, ministers should not be held responsible for what they did as would have been the case in the Westminster prime ministerial system which requires ministers to submit and accept collective responsibility for decisions which are made in the name of the Cabinet. If they disagree with what was said to be the Cabinet's decision, and cannot go along with such decisions, they are expected to resign. That at least is Westminster "best practice". The famous Lord Salisbury doctrine enunciated in 1878 remains relevant: "For all that passes in Cabinet, each member of it who does not resign is absolutely and irretrievably responsible, and has no right afterwards to say that he agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he was persuaded by his colleagues."

Most UK ministers submit. Occasionally, they may just threaten to resign. More rarely, they actually resign.

What happens depends on the Prime Minister—whether he wants the member to go or stay—or the standing of the Minister with the PM and his other colleagues. Resignations embarrass prime ministers and destabilise governments. They constitute a breach of solidarity.

For this reason, prime ministers either refuse resignations, or persuade MPs to reconsider. They might be reshuffled, a managerial tactic used by prime ministers to deal with intransigents.

Resignations are clumsy strategies for MPs to use to engineer changes of opinion. As one minister, Lord Birkenhead. explains, "If I had resigned every time my wise advice was rejected, I should seldom, indeed, have been in office." In sum, the doctrine of collective responsibility strengthens the power of the prime minister who is in fact a virtual elected monarch.

In situations such as we have in Trinidad and Tobago where ministers do not have many, or in some cases, any alternative career options, and politics is more partisan, zero-sum, and tribal, ministers never carry their dissent very far and meekly submit, sometimes with a shrug of resignation.

This passive behaviour is encouraged by their awareness that the PM can, if he is so minded, run the Cabinet as a CEO who owns all the company's shares. The PM, in effect, makes up the rules as he goes along, and has the power to make or break men, to say nothing about women, with no effective right of appeal.

Mr Manning took out Messrs Valley, Robinson-Regis, Hinds, Beckles, and when he wanted to show where power lay, he evicted Rowley. One recalls Rowley saying that Manning became "hostile, enraged and threatened to lose his cool" when, as the line minister for the Urban Development Corporation of Trinidad and Tobago (UDeCOTT), he raised questions in January 2008 about who had authorised e-Teck to build 50 presidential suites at the Hilton.

According to Rowley, "I knew then I was a marked man, and that I was finished since I had the temerity to challenge the Prime Minister's authority." He also indicated that Sunway had advertised the Hilton Project on its Malaysian website before it was approved by Cabinet. He was fired in April 2008 when he raised questions in a F&GP Committee meeting about plans to construct a hotel as part of the project relating to the National Academy for the Performing Arts.

Which neophyte cabinet minister would thereafter stare down the prime minister on any matter to which he was known to be committed? Who is collectively responsible when Cabinet notes are prepared by persons other than the Permanent Secretary in the ministry and taken to Cabinet for approval, or when decisions are taken outside Cabinet by persons who are not members of Cabinet, as has been known to happen?

Depending on whom one talks to, Mr Manning's style was seen as being either presidential or consensual or collegial. Margaret Thatcher epitomised the former. She believed in the sovereignty of her own opinions, dressed up as the nation's sovereignty.

She had no use for or sympathy with the notion of a collective executive which is assumed by the principle of collective responsibility. Thatcher did not believe in open cabinet meetings. She made decisions on the basis of bilaterals with ministers or small committees. Dissenters were quislings and traitors and not honourable men and women.

Given her struggle-driven temperament, she felt the need to govern, to intimidate, to dominate. She once complained that "life was always a daily battle. Why won't they do what I want them to?" She believed in "conviction government" and had no time to waste with internal arguments. She knew what she wanted and was not going to be blocked. She disliked having votes in cabinet and did not think her policies should be subject to being voted down by individuals whom she recruited to advice and assist her.

Some ministers have said that Manning's cabinet meetings were not like those of Mrs Thatcher. They were consensual, and that one was free to voice one's opinions if one wished. Others say that Mr Manning's "Father of the Nation" style on things that mattered did in fact resemble Mrs Thatcher's more, and that most of his line ministers had little say about what was to be done.

If this is so, should they be freed of the obligation of collective responsibility and be allowed to speak out about their experiences, or should they remain bound by the collective doctrine? Should Rowley alone play full back for the Manning defence team or should he do what Dr Williams did to those whom he called "millstones" in the 1976 election, viz attack his own Cabinet ministers?

Would that amount to having the PNM score "own goals" or would it free Rowley of the burden having to serve as the lone punching bag for the entire coalition team? My view is that as overwhelming as was Mr Manning's presence in the policy making process, he was not the only bison in the swamp. We should therefore modify the doctrine to allow ministers to account to the public for what they did or did not do. The Prime Minister should also be urged to come forward and tell the country why certain things were done or left undone. In this way, the public would be in better able to assign praise or blame which would therefore be shared equitably, if not equally. Let us discuss it.