History is made every day and the significance of the event is often lost in the moment. But it is on sober reflection that the full weight and importance of the moment is revealed. There are exceptions to this. There are times when we know instinctively that an event is a watershed moment and holds tremendous significance for the future. More importantly, how we deal with the problems or policy issues that arise from these situations, define how we develop as a people and as a nation. The revelations at the CL Financial CLF Commission Enquiry currently being held in Trinidad are such a defining moment.

The nation and the region look on with astonishment as the revelations of corporate misbehaviour and unbridled greed are chronicled and exposed on the front pages of the dailies. Unfortunately, the testimonies to date have been treated as a soap opera by the wider public with a sense of mild outrage. To date, it has only merited two editorials and a few letters to the editor. Most people affected have been more concerned with the issue of compensation that with the issue of crime and punishment.

What is of even greater significance is how we will respond to the revelations from a policy perspective. What are the changes that will be made to ensure that the same thing does not happen again or that there is reduced risk of its recurrence? More importantly, what are the sanctions and penalties to be suffered by the actors in this debacle?

Lest we forget, and as noted in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) outlook on the Caribbean region published earlier this year, the CLF Group (British American and Clico) accounted for 17 per cent of the GDP of the countries of the OECS region. The loss therefore is catastrophic in economic terms when one factors the implications of the global downturn on these Caribbean tourist economies.

This 17 per cent loss of GDP is of even greater significance when one considers that these states are already highly indebted as their debt to GDP ratios approximate 170 per cent of GDP on average. The OECS governments are therefore very limited in the size and scope of their interventions. Even Barbados has been warned by the IMF to stay clear of any bailout. This perhaps explains the comment made by the Trinidad and Tobago Minister of Finance that discussions with the OECS are ongoing. To what end, one might ask?

In Trinidad and Tobago, the full cost of the State's intervention has not been fully accounted for. Whilst the initial intervention was stated at $7.1 billion, the bill brought to Parliament in June 2011 provides for settlement to bondholders over an extended period at the State's expense with additional resources somewhere in the region of TT$12 billion. The total bill therefore will approximate TT$20 billion or approximately 45 per cent of the 2012 annual budget. This is neither cheap nor small and raises several issues on the sustainability of the Government's expenditure profile.

But what is the recovery action from the assets of the company and just exactly how is the surviving entity to function and meet its obligations to the "traditional" policies. No financial statements have been presented for the Group since December 2007 and we the public, are at a loss to understand exactly what the future holds when the Memorandum of Understanding comes to an end in January 2012. Is the company to be returned to the shareholders? And are we in for a protracted set of lawsuits by all affected parties?

In addition, what are the penalties for corporate malfeasance on such a massive scale? Businesses, lives and families have been damaged not merely in Trinidad and Tobago but in the wider region. How is existing company law to be amended to take cognisance of the offences committed in the boardroom or by directors by omission or commission, that have had wide societal impact and public sector costs? A deep financial wound remains exposed and is as yet untreated elsewhere in the Caribbean.

What are the penalties and sanctions when the State negotiates and provides resources in good faith, whilst the agents of the company sell a prime asset for an undervalued consideration?

In addition, how will the many people detained under a State of Emergency with little or no evidence feel or react to the ease with which corporate misbehaviour on such a massive scale escapes punishment? Is the mere telling of the tale and its recount in the public press sufficient or should some people go to jail?

Mariano Browne is a

former government minister

and now Managing Partner,

Browne and Company